Third Circuit Appellate Waivers: The Mysterious Miscarriage of Justice Standard by Malmgren Yeater, Kristine
Third Circuit Appellate Waivers: The Mysterious Miscarriage of Justice Standard
I. Introduction........................................... ...... 94
II. Why Plea Agreements are Made and Who is Involved..................94
III. The History of Rule 11: Ensuring a Guilty Plea is Entered Into Knowingly,
Voluntarily, and Without Coercion...............................96
IV. Appellate Waivers in the Plea Agreement......................98
V. Validity and Enforcement of Appellate Waivers................ ..... 100
VI. Third Circuit Plea Agreements Containing Appellate Waivers: Three Options for
Appeal ......................................... .......... 101
VII. Third Circuit Miscarriage of Justice Standard. ....................... 102
VIII. Suggestion for Adoption of a New Standard: Plain Error. ............... 105
IX. Conclusion................................................107
I. INTRODUCTION
Plea agreements are an integral and necessary component of the federal criminal justice
system, enabling prosecutors to guarantee convictions and maximize the efficiency of the courts,
while defendants aim to reduce their sentences. Often, plea agreements contain waivers of a
defendant's right to appeal his conviction or sentence. A defendant must have knowingly and
voluntarily entered into this agreement for it to be considered valid. To determine if the
agreement was entered into knowingly and voluntarily, the Third Circuit uses a "miscarriage of
justice" test, which is ill-defined and very rarely applied.
This Comment will first discuss plea agrcemcnts gcnerally (e.g., why they are madc and
who is involved in the process). In addition, this Comment will focus on the waivers of appellate
rights ihat arc often contained in pica agreements; specifically, it will study the right to appcal
and how defendants can use that right in the bargaining process. Third. and most importantly.
this Comment will cxamine the validity of plca agrcemcnts and cnforccmcnt of appcllate w\aivcrs
in the Third Circuit. It will begin with a review of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and a discussion of knowing and voluntary guilty picas. Furthermre, th1is Comment
will focus on how a "miscarriage of justice" is indeed difficult to attain. The Third Circuit's
"miscarriage of justice" concept is very broad, yet the theory is actually very rarely applied. Thc
Third Circuit seldom finds that a defendant would suffer a miscarriage of justice by enforcement
of his plca agrccmcnt's appcllatc \aivcr.
II. WHY PLEA AGREEMENTS ARE MADE AND WHO IS INVOLVED
In the federal criminal justice system, plea agreements are a key part of the system.' In
fact, in the federal system, most criminal cases are settled with a plea agreement.2  Plea
agreements have been defined as "rational agreements between a prosecutor and a defendant
where each attempts to maximize his respective benefit through the bargaining process."3 More
and more plea agreements throughout the federal criminal justice system, including plea
1. Ginger K. Gooch, The Message to Criminal Defendants- Waive at Your Own Risk: The Eighth
Circuit Enforces Waivers ofAppellate Rights, 64 Mo. L. REV. 459, 463 (1999).
2. Derek Teeter, A Contracts Analysis of Waivers of the Right to Appeal in Criminal Plea Bargains,
53 U. KAN. L. REV. 727, 727 (2005).
3. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. at 727.
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agreements entered into in the Third Circuit, contain waivers of the defendant's appellate rights.
Appellate waivers are generally enforced in the Third Circuit as long as the defendant entered
into the agreement knowingly5 and voluntarily 6 and absent a miscarriage of justice.7
In a plea agreement, both the prosecutor and the defendant are trying to maximize their
own benefit through their agreement.8 The prosecutor is also trying to increase the efficiency of
the criminal justice system by maximizing convictions of the guilty and dismissing charges
against the innocent.9 Sometimes offering a plea agreement to one defendant means that the
prosecutor might find out information regarding a more serious crime, or it might simply mean
more time that the prosecutor can spend on other cases.' 0 In addition, in a plea agreement, a
conviction of the defendant is guaranteed, while in a trial, the outcome is unpredictable."
Prosecutors want to maximize criminal convictions and the lengths of sentences. 12  Plea
agreements are a sound way to achieve this goal. 13
The defendant's goal in the plea agreement process is to obtain a lenient sentence while
balancing the costs to his reputation and future opportunities.14  To obtain his goals, the
defendant must place a lot of faith in his attorney.' 5 Defense counsel must effectively assist his
client in achieving his goals. 16 And defense counsel must adequately inform his client about his
options and the consequences of his decisions.1 7 As with the prosecutor, the unknown of a trial's
outcome is burdensome to defense counsel and is also an incentive for defense counsel to advise
his client to plead guilty and receive a more predictable sentence.' 8
The judge presiding over the defendant's case must remain an independent party during
the plea agreement process. 19 A judge is also interested in cases being resolved through plea
agreements, because he is less likely to commit reversible error than he would during a trial.20
He is required to examine whether the defendant's guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and
uncoerced.21 The federal judge is also responsible for ensuring that the defendant understands all
of the rights he will give up by pleading guilty.2 2 The federal judge's duties to examine a
defendant's guilty plea are outlined in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.23
4. Id. at 727-28.
5. Knowing is defined as "[h]aving or showing awareness or understanding; well-informed."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004).
6. Voluntarily is defined as "[i]intentionally; without coercion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1605
(8th ed. 2004).
7. United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001).
8. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. at 729.
9. F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The
Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 192 (2002).
10. Hessick & Saujani, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. at 192-93.
11. Id. at 193.
12. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. at 729.
13. Hessick & Saujani, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. at 193.
14. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. at 730.
15. Hessick & Saujani, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. at 207.
16. Id. at 206.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 211.
19. Id. at 222; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e).
20. Hessick & Saujani, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. at 226.
21. Id. at 222. Coerce is defined as "[t]o compel by force or threat." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 275
(8th ed. 2004). Clearly, an "uncoerced" guilty plea would be one that was not compelled by force or threat.
22. 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 392; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
23. Hessick & Saujani, 16 BYU J.PUB. L. at 224.
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Each participant in the plea agreement process, whether the prosecutor, defendant,
defense counsel, or judge, has an important role to play in the administration of justice.
Additionally, as set forth above, each participant has an incentive to enter into a plea agreement,
which is likely why most24 criminal cases are settled with plea agreements in the federal
system.25
III. THE HISTORY OF RULE 11: ENSURING THAT A GUILTY PLEA IS ENTERED INTO KNOWINGLY,
VOLUNTARILY, AND WITHOUT COERCION
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the guilty plea.26 It is a
procedural safeguard used to protect the parties and to ensure an orderly result.27 Rule 11 was
28first enacted in 1944. In 1966, a few amendments were made to Rule 11 where a court was
24. In 2000, about 84 percent of federal criminal cases were settled with plea agreements. Teeter, 53
U. KAN. L. REv. at 727 n.12.
25. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. at 727. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 260 (1971), stated that plea agreements are essential to the criminal justice system and are to be
encouraged. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. at 729.
26. Julian A. Cook, Federal Guilty Pleas Under Rule I1: The Unfulfilled Promise ofthe Post-Boykin
Era, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 597 (2002). The relevant portion of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure reads:
(b) Considering and Accepting a Guilty or Nolo Contendere Plea.
(1) Advising and Questioning the Defendant. Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, the defendant may be placed under oath, and the court must address the
defendant personally in open court. During this address, the court must inform the
defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following:
(A) the government's right, in a prosecution for perjury or false statement, to use
against the defendant any statement that the defendant gives under oath;
(B) the right to plead not guilty, or having already so pleaded, to persist in that
plea;
(C) the right to a jury trial;
(D) the right to be represented by counsel--and if necessary have the court
appoint counsel--at trial and at every other stage of the proceeding;
(E) the right at trial to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to be
protected from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and present evidence,
and to compel the attendance of witnesses;
(F) the defendant's waiver of these trial rights if the court accepts a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere;
(G) the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading;
(H) any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of
supervised release;
(I) any mandatory minimum penalty;
(J) any applicable forfeiture;
(K) the court's authority to order restitution;
(L) the court's obligation to impose a special assessment;
(M) in determining a sentence, the court's obligation to calculate the applicable
sentencing-guideline range and to consider that range, possible departures under
the Sentencing Guidelines, and other sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a); and
(N) the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to
collaterally attack the sentence.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
27. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. at 729.
28. Cook, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. at 606. The text of Rule 11 in 1944 read:
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now required to find a factual basis for the plea.2 9 With the 1966 amendments, the court was
also required to address the defendant personally. 30 A 1969 Supreme Court decision31 led to the
drastic 1975 alterations of Rule 11.32 The amendments can be described as drastic, because,
beginning with the 1975 amendments, they set forth procedural requirements for the judges to
follow to better ensure that defendants entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. Even with
all of the new specific requirements, courts still have discretion over how to implement the
procedure. 34 Under the 1975 amendments, the plea agreement must be disclosed in court on the
record, and the judge is permitted to accept or reject the plea agreement. 35 A judge must also
advise the defendant that if the court rejects the plea agreement, the defendant may withdraw his
plea and the court must tell the defendant that if he continues to plead guilty, the outcome may
be less favorable than it was with the terms of the plea agreement.36 In the 1975 amendments,
subsection (c) is probably the most notable change of the amendments. 37 Subsection (e) was also
added and included pre-plea conduct of the prosecutor and judiciary, rather than just plea hearing
procedure like in subsection (c).38
In the 1980s, Rule 11 was further amended a few times, though more modestly than the
1975 changes. 39 In 1982, a phrase was added to subsection (c)(1), "the effect of any special
pattern." 40 In 1983, a new subsection, (h), was added for instances when courts inadvertently
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with consent of the court, nolo contendere. The
court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with understand of the nature of the charge. If a defendant
refuses to plea or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails
to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
Id; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1944).
29. Cook, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. at 606.
30. Id.at 607.
31. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
32. Cook, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 607.
33. Id
34. Id. at 608.
35. Id. at 609.
36. Id. at 610.
37. Cook, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. at 607. Subsection (c) reads:
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant
personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following: the
nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by
law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; and if the defendant is not
represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of
the proceeding against him and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and that he
has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and that he
has the right to be tired by a jury and at that trial has the to the assistance of counsel, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to
incriminate himself; and that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further trial
of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial; and that if
he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, there court may ask him questions about the offense to which
he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of
counsel, his answers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c) (1975). The change is notable because now Rule 11(c) enumerates certain things that a
judge must tell a defendant before the judge can accept that defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Note to subdivision (c) under 1975 Enactment).
38. Cook, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 609.
39. Id. at 610.
40. Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c)(1) (1982).
Summer 2 010 97
4
Duquesne Criminal Law Journal, Vol. 2 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://ddc.duq.edu/dclj/vol2/iss2/3
Duquesne Criminal Law Journal
missed a part of the Rule 11 procedure, providing that it would be harmless error.4 1 Another
phrase was added in 1989, "or supervised release," in response to the 1987 United States
Sentencing Guidelines.42 Conditional pleas43 were added to the list of plea alternatives so that
defendants could plead guilty but preserve items of concern for appellate review.44 And in 1999,
subsection (c)(6) was added to ensure that courts went over the appellate waiver provision in a
plea agreement.45 In 2002, Rule 11 was reorganized so that they could be better understood and
so the terminology was consistent with the rest of the rules.46 After United States v. Booker47,
the United States Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory, and the 2007 Amendments of Rule 11
reflected that change.48
In the Third Circuit, the Court of Appeals reviews the district court's Rule 11 plea
colloquy49 with the defendant not only to see if the guilty plea was entered knowingly,
voluntarily, and uncoerced, but also to examine whether plea agreements were validly entered.o
The Third Circuit maintains that a plea agreement is valid if it is entered into knowingly and
-51voluntarily.
IV. APPELLATE WAIVERS IN PLEA AGREEMENTS
The right to appeal is neither constitutional nor ancient.52 The number of appeals grew
exponentially after the United States Sentencing Guidelines took effect, because a defendant
could raise hundreds of sentencing issues under the guidelines on appeal.53 Prosecutors hoped to
41. Cook, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 610; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (h) (1983).
42. Cook, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. at 610; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c)(1) (1989).
43. A conditional plea is defined as "[a] plea of guilty or nolo contendere entered with the court's
approval and the government's consent, the defendant reserving the right to appeal any adverse determinations on
one or more pretrial motions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1189 (8th ed. 2004).
44. Cook, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 610.
45. Id.
46. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (under 2002 Amendments).
47. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The advisory committee explains:
Booker held that the provision of the federal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines
mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), violates the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. With this
provision severed and excised, the Court held, the Sentencing Reform Act "makes the Guidelines
effectively advisory," and "requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, see 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(4) (Supp.2004), but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other
statutory concerns as well, see § 3553(a) (Supp. 2004)."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (under 2007 Amendments) (quoting Booker 543 at 245-46).
48. "Rule I I(b)(M) incorporates [the Booker] analysis into the information provided to the defendant
at the time of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere." FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's note (under 2007
Amendments).
49. A colloquy is "[a]ny formal discussion, such as an oral exchange between a judge, the prosecutor,
the defense counsel, and a criminal defendant in which the judge ascertains the defendant's understanding of the
proceedings and of the defendant's rights." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (8th ed. 2004).
50. Khattak, 273 F.3d at 558; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (plea agreement must
be knowing and voluntary).
51. United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).
52. Ginger K. Gooch, 64 MO. L. REV.at 459.
53. Nancy J. King and Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55
Duke L.J. 209, 219-20 (2005). A defendant could raise hundreds of sentencing issues under the guidelines on
appeal, because under the United States Sentencing Guidelines each offense conduct is assigned a base offense
level-a certain amount of points. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2, introductory cmt. (2008).
Next, points are added to the base offense level for specific offense characteristics that fit the facts of the offense
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avoid challenges when defendants pled guilty by adding appellate waivers to plea agreements. 54
Appellate waivers became widespread in the early 1990s and slowly were upheld in the federal
circuits across the country.5 5 It is widely accepted for criminal defendants to bargain with their
right to appeal their conviction and sentence.56 The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
of whether a criminal defendant can bargain with his appellate rights.57 Each federal circuit that
allows a criminal defendant to bargain with his appellate rights, however, requires that the
defendant must have "knowingly" and "voluntarily" entered into the agreement for it to be
valid.5 8  The judge's duty in the federal criminal justice system is to examine whether the
defendant's guilty plea, and plea agreement, are entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and
uncoerced. 59 The judge accomplishes this task by following Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.6 0
conduct. Id. A defendant can raise on appeal every specific offense characteristic that is added to the base offense
level. For example, the base offense level for aggravated assault is 14. Id at §2A2.2. The specific offense
characteristics that can be added to aggravated assault include:
(1) If the assault involved more than minimal planning, increase by 2 levels.
(2) If (A) a firearm was discharged, increase by 5 levels; (B) a dangerous weapon (including a
firearm) was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; (C) a dangerous weapon (including a firearm)
was brandished or its use was threatened, increase by 3 levels.
(3) If the victim sustained bodily injury, increase the offense level according to the seriousness of
the injury:
Degree of Bodily Injury Increase in Level
(A) Bodily Injury add 3
(B) Serious Bodily Injury add 5
(C) Permanent or Life-Threatening Bodily Injury add 7
(D) If the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions (A) and (B), add 4
levels; or
(E) If the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions (B) and (C), add 6
levels.
However, the cumulative adjustments from application of subdivisions (2) and (3) shall
not exceed 10 levels.
(4) If the assault was motivated by a payment or offer of money or other thing of value, increase
by 2 levels.
(5) If the offense involved the violation of a court protection order, increase by 2 levels.
(6) If the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) or § 115, increase by 2 levels.
Id. On appeal, the defendant could raise every special offense characteristic that the district court found applicable.
54. King and O'Neill, 55 Duke L.J. at 220. With a waiver of appellate rights, "criminal defendants
may, in several ways, lose or waive whatever rights to appeal are granted to them." Kristine Cordier Karnezis, 89
A.L.R. 3d 864 §2[a]. Additionally, "in a negotiated plea agreement, a defendant expressly waives the right to appeal
in order to obtain certain concessions from the state." Id
55. King and O'Neill, 55 Duke L.J. at 220-2 1. In the early 1990s, the Fourth Circuit saw a significant
increase in the amount of illegal reentry of aliens cases. Id at 220. In response, prosecutors began a "fast-track
program," where defendants who pled guilty early would receive a significantly lower sentence if he agreed to
waive all of his rights-including the right to appeal. Id. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits also began to follow the
Fourth Circuit's fast-track program. Id. at 221. Six additional courts of appeals upheld the validity of appellate
waivers by the end of 1995. Id. The wide success of appellate waivers led to a memo to the United States Attorneys
from the Washington which encouraged them to make use of appellate waivers. King and O'Neill, 55 Duke L.J. at
221.
56. Ginger K. Gooch, 64 MO. L. REV.at 459.
57. Id. at 463.
58. Id at 464.
59. Hessick & Saujani, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. at 222; 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 392; FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11.
60. FED. R. CfIM. P. 11 (2008).
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V. VALIDITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF APPELLATE WAIVERS
As part of his plea agreement, a defendant can waive most of his constitutional rights.61
The Supreme Court has yet to specifically address appellate waivers, but seems to lean towards
approval of appellate waivers.62 Meanwhile, every federal circuit court of appeals has held that
the theory of appellate waivers is valid.63
The federal circuit courts of appeals approve of appellate waivers because defendants are
permitted to waive constitutional rights. 64 The right to appeal is a statutory right-it is not even
a constitutional right.65 The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not include a
right to appeal in criminal cases. 66 But if a defendant has the right to freely trade constitutional
rights, he surely can bargain away his statutory rights as well-such as his right to appeal.67
Tests for the validity of waivers of the right to appeal vary between districts. 68 Some
tests are quite vague but others are rather strict.69 The vague tests7o usually give a broad
exception to the validity of the appellate waiver where a "miscarriage of justice" has occurred.
The courts using a vague test-such as the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits-do not fully define
the "miscarriage of justice" concept.72 This fact makes it difficult for the parties involved to
know whether the court will enforce their appellate waiver. 73  The strict testS74 allow no
exceptions if the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily.75
61. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. at 737.
62. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. at 738; see United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-04 (1995).
63. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. at 738.
64. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. at 738; Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201 ("A criminal defendant may
knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution.").
65. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. at 738; see 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (appeal from an illegal sentence); see 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (a general appeal from a final order).
66. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. at 739; Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977). In 1889, Congress enacted a statute first allowing appeals as of right in criminal
cases where the crime was punishable by death. Abney, 431 U.S. at 656 n.3. Not until 1911 was a general right of
appeal created for criminal cases. Id.
67. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. at 738; Khattak, 273 F.3d at 561.
68. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. at 728. For example, the First, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits use a
broad approach that a waiver of a right to appeal is valid if it is knowing, voluntary, and enforcement would work a
miscarriage of justice-yet miscarriage of justice goes undefined. Id. at 746 n.130, 133, 137, & 139; United States
v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001); Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563; United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891 (8th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1327 (10th Cir. 2004). The Fourth Circuit's approach is that the
waiver is valid if entered into knowingly and voluntarily unless a sentence was imposed "in excess of the statutory
maximum or if the court relied on an impermissible factor, such as race." Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. at 748; United
States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000). Additionally, the Fifth Circuit only requires that the waiver be
made knowingly and voluntarily. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. at 747; United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567
(5th Cir. 1992).
69. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. at 728.
70. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26; Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563; Andis, 333 F.3d at 891; Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327.
71. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. at 728.
72. Id. The Tenth Circuit attempts to limit its miscarriage of justice exception "where the alleged
error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation ofjudicial proceedings...' Id. at 747.
73. Id. at 746.
74. See Brown, 232 F.3d 403; see also Melancon, 972 F.2d at 567.
75. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. at 728.
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The Third Circuit follows a First Circuit decision, United States v. Teeter, 6 which uses
the broad miscarriage of justice exception. Miscarriage of justice is not defined in Teeter.7 9
This broad conception of miscarriage of justice makes the plea bargaining system uncertain.79
What is problematic is that the two sides cannot weigh the benefits of the plea agreement if they
are uncertain as to whether the plea agreement will be enforced.80
VI. THIRD CIRCUIT PLEA AGREEMENTS CONTAINING APPELLATE WAIVERS: THREE OPTIONS
FOR APPEAL
When a criminal defendant in the Third Circuit who has entered into a plea agreement
that contains an appellate waiver wants to appeal his conviction or sentence, he has three
arguments that he can make so the Third Circuit will exercise jurisdiction over the merits of his
appeal.8 1 First, he could argue that his appellate issues do not "fall within the scope of his
appellate waiver." 82 Second the defendant could argue that he did not knowingly and voluntarily
enter into the plea agreement.83  Third, the defendant could argue that "enforcing the waiver
would work a miscarriage of justice." 84
When the Third Circuit looks to the scope of the appellate waiver, it must heed the
language of the waiver-for plea agreements are "analyzed under contract law standards."85
Thus, the appellate waiver's language is of grave importance, as is the language in a contract.86
In addition, appellate waivers are necessarily "strictly construed."87 The language of appellate
waivers often includes limited exceptions that allow the defendant to appeal.88 Oftentimes, for
example, the defendant may appeal if the government took an appeal, if the sentence exceeded
the statutory limit, or if the sentence unreasonably exceeded the sentencing court's guideline
76. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14; Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563.
77. Teeter, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. at 746.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. A defendant is unable to predict whether or not his waiver of appellate rights will be enforced
if the test is vague. Id. at 749. With a vague test:
Two results are likely: either defendants who might not otherwise waive their right to appeal will,
because they think the miscarriage of justice exception is broader than it actually is, or defendants
who otherwise would plead guilty will not, because they are frightened by dicta indicating that the
miscarriage of justice exception is narrower than it actually is.
Id
81. United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 927 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529,
536 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2008); Gwinnett, 483 F.3d at 203.
82. Corso, 549 F.3d at 927; Jackson, 523 F.3d at 244.
83. Corso, 549 F.3d at 927; Jackson, 523 F.3d at 243.
84. Corso, 549 F.3d at 927; Jackson, 523 F.3d at 244.
85. Corso, 549 F.3d at 927 (citing Goodson, 544 F.3d at 535 n. 3); see also United States v. Williams,
510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007).
86. Corso, 549 F.3d at 927 (citing Goodson, 544 F.3d at 535).
87. Corso, 549 F.3d at 927 (citing Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562); see also Williams, 510 F.3d at 422.
88. Corso, 549 F.3d at 927; see also United States v. Fekos, 318 Fed. Appx. 122, 123 (3d Cir. 2009);
United States v. Koh1miller, 304 Fed. Appx. 956, 958 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Stevenson, 281 Fed. Appx.
85, 86 (3d Cir. 2008); Morrison, 282 Fed. Appx. at 171.
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range. 89 If none of the exceptions apply, then the defendant must advance another argument as
to why his plea agreement should not be enforced. 90
A defendant's second argument for the Third Circuit to disregard his appellate waiver
and to address the merits of his appeal is that he unknowingly and involuntarily entered his plea
agreement.91 In Brady v. United States92 the Supreme Court held that plea agreements must be
made knowingly and voluntarily. The sentencing judge's role is "critical" in determining
whether the defendant's guilty plea and plea agreement are made knowingly and voluntarily. 93
The Third Circuit reviews a district court's Rule 11 plea colloquy during the defendant's change
of plea hearing to assess whether the sentencing judge complied with Rule 11 and to determine
that the defendant entered his plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily. 94 If the sentencing
judge complied with Rule 11, the Third Circuit deems the defendant's plea agreement knowingly
and voluntarily entered into, making his waiver of appeal valid.95
Finally, a defendant's third argument so that the Third Circuit will not enforce his
appellate waiver when he appeals is that "enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of
justice."96 The Third Circuit has been careful not to specifically define when enforcement of an
appellate waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.97 Rather, the Third Circuit seems to take
more of an "I know it when I see it" approach. 98
VII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE STANDARD
Instead of defining "miscarriage of justice," the Third Circuit follows the First Circuit's
approach in setting forth factors to consider.99 These factors include:
[T]he clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact
issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of the error on
the defendant, the impact of correcting the error on the government, and the
extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result. 00
These factors are supposed to provide guidelines for the court to determine when enforcement of
an appellate waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.101 The Third Circuit has also provided
a couple of examples of a miscarriage of justice, such as "a sentence based on constitutionally
impermissible criteria, such as race, or a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum sentence
for the defendant's crime."' 0 2
89. Corso, 549 F.3d at 927; Fekos, 318 Fed. Appx. at 123; Kohlmiller, 304 Fed. Appx. at 957;
Stevenson, 281 Fed. Appx. at 86; Morrison, 282 Fed. Appx. at 171 n.2.
90. Corso, 549 F.3d at 927.
91. Corso, 549 F.3d at 927; Jackson, 523 F.3d at 243.
92. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
93. Corso, 549 F.3d at 931 (citing Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563); see also United States v. Schweitzer,
454 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2006).
94. Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563.
95. Id.
96. Corso, 549 F.3d at 927; Jackson, 523 F.3d at 244.
97. Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563.
98. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Sterwart, J., concurring) (Justice Stewart's
famous approach to defining obscenity).
99. Id; see Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25-26.
100. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25-26).
101. Id.
102. Gwinnett, 483 at 203 (citing United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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Indeed, the Third Circuit has found a few instances where a defendant would suffer a
miscarriage of justice. First, if a defendant should have been permitted by the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea and was not permitted to do so, the defendant's appellate waiver may
not be enforced.103 Second, the defendant's appellate waiver' 04 may not be enforced if the
defendant did not understand his guilty plea due to "constitutionally deficient lawyering" or if
the deficient attorney failed to file a direct appeal for an issue included in the plea agreement that
was an exception to the appellate waiver.'os
In analyzing whether enforcement of an appellate waiver would work a miscarriage of
justice, at times, the Third Circuit does not go into much analysis beyond simply listing the First
Circuit's factors.106 Rather, the Third Circuit sometimes stops the analysis after determining that
the defendant's Rule 11 plea colloquy was valid and that the defendant's guilty plea and plea
agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily.107 In some cases, the Third Circuit
simply affirms the decision below without reaching the merits, because the defendant did not
argue miscarriage of justice.1os Conversely, in other cases, the court reaches the merits in order
to determine whether enforcing the appellate waiver would work a miscarriage of justice-when
sometimes the defendant argues a miscarriage of justice and other times the defendant does not
even mention his appellate waiver.109 The Third Circuit must create a procedure that it follows
each time it reviews appeals of criminal defendants who have entered into plea agreements with
appellate waivers so that the federal criminal justice system can be effective and similarly
applied for all defendants. While the Third Circuit's "miscarriage of justice" concept is very
broad, the theory is actually very rarely applied-and seldom is the procedure consistent.
Although the Third Circuit admittedly categorizes the miscarriage of justice as "quite
narrow" and that it should be applied sparingly, 10 the court should advance a set procedure for
analyzing whether enforcement of an appellate waiver would work a miscarriage of justice. The
Third Circuit chose not to define miscarriage of justice so that the concept could be analyzed on
case by case basis,"' but a specific procedure would still allow for a case by case analysis.
Additionally, a specific procedure would also allow each case to be uniformly analyzed so both
the government and the defendant knows what to expect from the court.
Oftentimes in practice, defendants are unhappy with the length of their sentences, and on
appeal they are not trying to invalidate their guilty plea but are trying to obtain a shorter
sentence. It is more difficult for a defendant to try to argue that enforcement of his plea
103. United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005).
104. Appellate waivers also often include a collateral attack waiver. United States v. Shedrick, 493
F.3d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 2007). In the case of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the collateral attack waiver
would be in question.
105. Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 298. In addition, the Third Circuit has held that it may not enforce a
defendant's appellate waiver where the government breached its plea agreement obligations. United States v.
Schwartz, 511 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2008). This argument, however, is based on contract principles & not the
miscarriage of justice exception.
106. United States v. Barralaga-Rodriguez, 164 Fed. Appx. 270, 273 (3d Cir. 2006).
107. United States v. Sanchez, 306 Fed. Appx. 797, 798 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Paladino, 286
Fed. Appx. 803, 804 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Howard, 319 Fed. Appx. 165, 166 (3d Cir. 2009).
108. Morrison, 282 Fed. Appx. at 171-72; United States v. Shirriel, 264 Fed. Appx. 218, 220 (3d Cir.
2008); United States v. Sabater, 270 Fed. Appx. 219, 221 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Wycoff, 256 Fed. Appx.
501, 504 (3d Cir. 2007).
109. United States v. Grimm, 282 Fed. Appx. 194, 195 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008); Stevenson, 281 Fed. Appx.
at 87.
110. Wilson, 429 F.3d at 458-60 & n.6.
111. Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563.
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agreement, which contains an appellate waiver, would work a miscarriage of justice for a
sentencing issue than to try to completely invalidate his guilty plea. 112 If a defendant does not
want to invalidate his guilty plea but simply wants to challenge his sentence, and if the sentence
is not within the scope of the exceptions to his appellate waiver, a defendant must try to argue
that enforcement of his plea agreement appellate waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.
The problem in the Third Circuit is that the defendant is unsure of how to appropriately argue to
the circuit that he would suffer a miscarriage of justice.
If a defendant wishes to invalidate his guilty plea, however, one way he can do so is with
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.'' 3 In United States v. Shedrick, the Third Circuit
heard the merits of the appeal because they proclaimed that the defendant had suffered a
"miscarriage of justice."1 14  The miscarriage of justice standard was not actually defined by
Shedrick - the court did not further explain the concept.
Furthermore, one can invalidate a guilty plea by arguing that the plea was made
unknowingly and involuntarily. 115  If a defendant wants to invalidate his guilty plea, he could
argue that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, rather than arguing that he would
suffer a miscarriage of justice if his appellate waiver was enforced. It is easier to challenge a
conviction by arguing under the knowing and voluntary standard, because Rule 11 guides this
standard. 116 Defense counsel knows what to argue while the prosecutor can anticipate defense
counsel's arguments.
112. For example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals states that "if the district court's sentence is
procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence
on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided." United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568
(3d Cir. 2009). Therefore, the district court is given wide deference in sentencing defendants. This deference makes
it difficult for the court of appeals to disagree with the district court, to find that the district court has erred, and to
find that the defendant must be re-sentenced.
113. Ineffective assistance of counsel is defined as:
A representation in which the defendant is deprived of a fair trial because the lawyer handles the
case unreasonably, usually either by performing incompetently or by not devoting full effort to the
defendant, especially because of a conflict of interest. * In determining whether a criminal
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, courts generally consider several factors: (1)
whether the lawyer had previously handled criminal cases; (2) whether strategic trial tactics were
involved in the allegedly incompetent action; (3) whether, and to what extent, the defendant was
prejudiced as a result of the lawyer's alleged ineffectiveness; and (4) whether the ineffectiveness
was due to matters beyond the lawyer's control.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 130 (8th ed. 2004).
The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel has been held to imply the "right to the
effective assistance of counsel." The Court has often said that the converse - ineffective
assistance of counsel - is a constitutional denial of the Sixth Amendment right, even if the
lawyer has been retained by rather than appointed for the defendant. "Ineffective" does not
necessarily mean incompetent or unprepared; it means an inability to perform as an independent
lawyer devoted to the defendant.... However, counsel's assistance is not necessarily ineffective
because the lawyer made mistakes. Only very serious errors, such as would likely have produced
an entirely different outcome at trial, will suffice to require a new trial.
Id. (quoting Jethro K. Lieberman, The Evolving Constitution 263-64 (1992).
114. See Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292.
115. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
116. See supra note 26.
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VIII. A SUGGESTION FOR ADOPTION OF A NEW STANDARD: PLAIN ERROR
The Third Circuit needs a defined standard for the miscarriage of justice exception - for
instance, defense counsel can follow Rule 11 when arguing that a plea was unknowingly and
involuntarily made. The Court should create a standard for the miscarriage of justice
procedurally akin to the plain error standard." 7
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Hahn found that they had "not previously defined
[the miscarriage of justice] exception, but [they had] described many of its components.118 One
of these components, which the Third Circuit does not follow, was "where the waiver is
otherwise unlawful."119 The Tenth Circuit held that to satisfy this factor, "the error [must]
seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings[,] as that test
was employed in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508
(1993)." 120
The plain error standard comes from "Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which
governs on appeal from criminal proceedings, provides a court of appeals a limited power to
correct errors that were forfeited because not timely raised in district court." 121 Obviously the
miscarriage of justice procedure would differ because the subject of the appeal could have been
preserved below, but the plain error standard would apply because of the appellate waiver
provision. Rule 52(b)'s language provides: "Plain errors or defects affecting the substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." 122 The
Supreme Court held that for plain error 1) there must be an error; 2) the error must be plain; 3)
and the error must affect substantial rights. 123 The court of appeals has the discretion to correct
the error, but it must "seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." 124
For the court to find a miscarriage of justice, first the defendant would have to argue that
there indeed was error. The Supreme Court explained, however, that if a defendant waives his
right he cannot later argue that he should have been entitled to whatever it is that he waived.125
For a miscarriage of justice standard, the basis of a defendant's argument could not simply be
that he should have had the opportunity to appeal. There must be some error present not
regarding the appellate waiver itself. The Supreme Court explains that a waiver differs from
forfeiture-the former is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right" 26
and the latter is the "failure to make a timely assertion of a right."127 Therefore, the error must
be a violation of a legal rule that was not waived by the defendant.
117. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-34 (1993). See also Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327.
118. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327.
119. Id. The other three components that the Tenth Circuit listed were "[1] where the district court
relied on an impermissible factor such as race, [2] where ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the
negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, [3] where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum..." Id
(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Elliot, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001).
120. Id
121. Olano, 507 U.S. at 731; see also FED. R. CIuM. P. 52(b).
122. FED. R. CIuM. P. 52(b).
123. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
125. Id. at 733.
126. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zarbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
127. Id.
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Second, the defendant must show that the error was plain, which the Supreme Court
explained "is synonymous with 'clear' or, equivalently, 'obvious."' 128 And third, the error must
affect the defendant's substantial rights.129 The Supreme Court explains that this means that the
error needs to be prejudicial-"[i]t must have affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings." 130
The Tenth Circuit standards for miscarriage of justice would aid those who are faltering
(whether the defense, prosecution, or the judge) in the Third Circuit. The way that the Third
Circuit proceeds now-without defining "miscarriage of justice" or offering any procedure-is
not providing equal treatment in each defendant's case. As stated above, the Third Circuit
handles the cases differently and defendants are unsure as to what needs to be present for a
miscarriage of justice to exist in his case. Furthermore, enforcing a plea agreement regardless of
any unusual circumstances as long as the plea agreement was made knowingly and voluntarily is
too strict of an approach. Some grave mistake might have been made in a defendant's case, and
with this approach, there is no way for a defendant to have his case reviewed. This system could
lead to harsh, draconian results.
Additionally, the miscarriage of justice in the Third Circuit is even less likely to come to
a resolution because of the court's influential suggestion in United States v. Goodson.'3 1 In a
footnote, the court "emphasized that the government may file a motion for summary action under
Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 to enforce the waiver and to dismiss the appeal" so that the
government may "obtain the full benefit of its bargain."132 In response, the defendant can submit
an argument in opposition of the government's motion, and a motion's panel then would rule on
the "enforceability of the waiver." 133 The court finds this process beneficial to the government
stating that "briefing at this stage is limited to the validity and scope of the waiver."1 34 This
process to enforce the defendant's plea agreement, however, provides no insight as to how a
defendant can argue that enforcement of his waiver would work a miscarriage of justice. This
process also, if utilized and if successful for the government, drastically reduces the number of
Third Circuit opinions dealing with appellate waivers.' 3 5 Therefore, those involved in the plea
agreement process have less of a chance that further instructions on a Third Circuit miscarriage
of justice will be provided.136
128. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 17).
129. Id.
130. Id




135. The Chief of the Appellate Division for the Office of the United States Attorney in the Western
District of Pennsylvania ("WDPA") reported that since the Third Circuit's emphasis on this process in Goodson, his
office indeed heeds this suggestion of the court. Interview with Robert L. Eberhardt, Chief of Appeals, Office of the
United States Attorney, Western District of Pennsylvania ("WDPA"), in Pittsburgh, Pa. (Oct. 28, 2009). The
WDPA makes a motion to the Third Circuit to dismiss an appellant's case when a defendant has entered into a plea
agreement with an appellate waiver. Id The WDPA has been successful and has had many of its motions for
dismissal granted. Id. Other districts within the Third Circuit follow a similar procedure. Id. Therefore, this
process is utilized and is successful for the government.
136. The only way that the court can reach the miscarriage of justice exception and be able to give a
complete analysis in an opinion is where the government makes a motion to dismiss the appeal and where the court
denies the government's motion. Then the case would proceed to briefing on the merits. Even then, the defendant
would need to make a compelling miscarriage of justice argument in his response to the government's motion.
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Providing some sort of approach for the defendant and his counsel-particularly, one
akin to plain error procedure-would help all parties involved in the process. With a procedure
to follow regarding a miscarriage of justice argument, all those who are involved with the plea
agreement process would benefit. First, defense counsel would have an outline to follow and
would be aware of what arguments he needs to make to satisfy the miscarriage of justice
standard for the Third Circuit to reach the merits of the defendant's case. Second, the defendant
would know what kind of barrier he would have to overcome to show that enforcing his plea
agreement containing an appellate waiver would work a miscarriage of justice. Third, the
defendant would also know whether his defense counsel was advocating his position properly.
Fourth, the prosecutor could better prepare, because he would have a better understanding of
what kind of an argument to expect from defense counsel. Fifth, the prosecutor could also
analyze the case with the plain error standard to ensure that justice was properly administered.
And sixth, the judge would understand what standard the Third Circuit would use to review the
defendant's case on appeal.
IX. CONCLUSION
With the frequent use of plea agreements in the federal criminal justice system, and the
widespread popularity of appellate waivers, all parties involved need to understand the meaning
of "miscarriage of justice." With some type of procedure in place to aid a defendant in arguing
that enforcement of his appellate waiver would work a miscarriage of justice, all parties would
benefit. Use of the plain error standard to guide arguments for miscarriage of justice may be one
suggestion among others, but clearly the Third Circuit must eventually attain a permanent
solution to the confusion.
Kristine Malm gren Yeater
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